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Why Kentucky's Use of the
Abandonment Test in Deciding the
Ownership of Mineral Refuse Is Inadequate
Monica Hobson Braun1
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The History of Mineral Refuse and Current Advancements
S INCE coal was first mined in Kentucky on April 13, 1750,2 it has greatly
impacted the Commonwealth. The legal community has certainly
not been immune from this impact, as courts within the state have issued
countless decisions concerning the coal and mineral industry. A century of
litigation has yet to resolve many of these issues, as Kentucky courts are
consistently being asked to further shape the law surrounding the mineral
industry. An issue currently garnering attention concerns the ownership
of mineral waste and refuse. While the coal mining process has always
produced waste, technological improvements and state regulation have
radically changed the amount of waste and disposal processes of mining
refuse.3 These developments are forcing legislative reconsideration of
century-old property law, as well as obviating the need for a new approach
to decide these challenging and complex property disputes. In addition,
these developments have demonstrated that several general principles of
property law, long used in the area of mineral ownership, are insufficient
and lacking.
Early mining processes were limited in their ability to separate valuable
minerals, such as coal from the mineral waste.4 Therefore, when the
waste was disposed, commonly through the creation of a refuse pond that
I J.D. expected, May 2009, University of Kentucky College of Law; B.A. in Political
Science, summa cum laude, May zoo6, University of Kentucky. The author would like to
thank her husband, Lucas Braun, for his support and encouragement.
2 Ky COAL MKTG. AND Exp. COUNCIL & Ky. COAL ASS'N, KENTUCKY COAL FACTS 4 (1995-
1996).
3 SOCIETY OF MINING ENGINEERS, ELEMENTS OF PRACTICAL COAL MINING 514 (Samuel
Cassidy ed., Port City Press 1973).
4 Foreman v. Beaverhead County, 161 P.zd 524, 525 (Mont. 1945).
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was covered with soil when the mining operation ceased,' commercially
valuable minerals were buried along with the waste.6 Other methods of
waste disposal included, and still include, the creation of well-maintained
piles on the surface of the ground.7 Advances in technology now allow
for the easy separation of these minerals from wastes.' Due to the easy
removal of these wastes, mineral extraction operators are re-mining areas,
especially former refuse ponds, taking advantage of the minerals located on
or buried just below the surface.9
This innovative practice has led to complex disputes over the ownership
of this waste. These disputes typically occur between the owners of the
surface estate and the owners of the mineral estate.10 Kentucky has long
recognized the division of-a parcel of land between surface and mineral
owners." The effect of this division is to create separate and distinct estates
in the surface and minerals," with the holder of each estate considered a
landowner. 3 Furthermore, the surface owner is deemed to hold possession
of the minerals beneath the land as trustee for the legal owner of the
mineral estate. 4 Not surprisingly, it is immensely important to ascertain
which elements of the land are passed through a deed to the mineral estate
as well as those that remain with the owner of the surface estate, as the
financial implications for both parties are immense. Principally, minerals,
such as oil, gas, coal, or timber, are considered real estate as long as they
remain unsevered from the soil.'5 If the mineral estate is sold to another,
such realty will be considered conveyed in that transaction, as long as the
minerals remain in place. 6 Logically, anything not conveyed in the mineral
estate will be retained by the owner of the surface estate, including any
personal property upon the land.
Minerals are converted from real estate to personal property upon
severance from the soil.' 7 It is generally accepted that refuse incident
5 SOCIETY OF MINING ENGINEERS, Supra note 3, at 514-15.
6 See Foreman, 161 P.zd at 525 ("Tailings are the waste material remaining after the
removal of the valuable minerals ....").
7 Elk Horn Coal Corp. v. Allen, 324 S.W.2d 829,831 (Ky. 1959).
8 See Foreman, 161 P.2d. at 525 (plaintiff processed wastes and removed valuable
materials).
9 See id. at 524-25.
Io See Elk Horn, 324 S.W.2d at 830 (suit by coal company operating under mineral deed
against surface owners over who owned dump containing "red dog").
I I Kincaid v. Magowan, 12 Ky. Op. 673, 678 (Ky. 1884).
12 Vanbever v. Evans, 177 S.W.2d 148 (Ky. 1944).
13 Gabbard v. Sheffield, 2oo S.W. 94o, 943 (Ky. 1918) (quoting Kincaid, 12 KY. Op. 673).
14 Eli v. Trent, 241 S.W. 324, 325 (Ky. 1922).
15 Williams' Adm'r. v. Union Bank & Trust, 143 S.W.2d 297, 300 (Ky. 194o).
I6 Id.
17 Hail v. Reed, 15 B. Mon. 479, 1854WL 3852, 6, (i B. Mon. 1854).
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to mining is considered personal property." The issue presented by the
mining of wastes that have long been disposed of or abandoned is whether
the wastes retain their status as personal property, thus passing with the
surface estate in any subsequent land transfers, or whether they revert to
realty and pass as part of the mineral estate. The determination of whether
the mineral refuse constitutes personal property or real estate has great
financial magnitude, as the prevailing party will possess commercially
valuable minerals. Despite the importance of this issue, Kentucky has only
addressed the matter twice, both times in a quite limited and unsatisfactory
fashion. 9 Other states addressing the issue have promulgated a variety
of tests to determine whether mine refuse constitutes real or personal
property."0 With the recent developments in mining technologies, disputes
among surface and mineral estate owners are likely to increase.
This Note seeks to outline Kentucky's limited treatment of the
issue, followed by an examination of alternative tests employed by other
jurisdictions. In conclusion, this Note will advocate a new approach for
Kentucky courts to decide the aforementioned ownership disputes. Section
I provides a history of Kentucky law surrounding this issue, specifically the
continued reliance on the abandonment test. Following an examination
of the advantages and disadvantages of this test, a discussion will follow
as to the lack of guidance to be found within Kentucky's administrative
regulations and statutory law, despite the heavy regulation of the mining
industry. Section II will then look to the tests employed by other states,
beginning with the test that looks to the intent of the extractor when the
refuse was deposited. After examining the merits and disadvantages of the
intent approach, this Note will look at an additional alternative test, which
asserts that mineral wastes that are embedded or intermingled within the
earth constitute real property.
After detailing the many advantages of the position, as well as discussing
its limitations, Section III will propose a new test for Kentucky courts
to adopt when considering the ownership of mineral wastes. The new
approach is a two-pronged amalgam of the other tests, ordered in a manner
which will provide Kentucky with an innovative and just manner through
which to adjudicate these immensely important and often complicated
property disputes. The proposed test will incorporate the benefits of other
approaches, with substantial modification, so as to eliminate the inherent
limitations contained within any one test. The first prong of the proposed
test will involve the adoption of an alternative test which holds that wastes
intermingled or fixed within the earth constitute real property. The status
of the wastes as intermingled or not intermingled, which is an objective
18 Gilberton Coal Co. v. Schuster, 169 A.2d 44,45 (Pa. I961).
19 Elk Horn Coal Corp. v. Allen, 324 S.W.2d 829 (Ky. 1959) (holding that mineral refuse
was not "stone" for purposes of mineral deed).
20 See infra notes 74-84, 85-1o3.
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analysis, should constitute a rebuttable presumption. The second prong of
the proposed test is that either party is permitted to introduce subjective,
contrary evidence to rebut the presumption established under the first
prong. This subjective analysis prevents any unfairness created by a purely
objective analysis. Though other states interchangeably employ multiple
tests,2 1 no state has explicitly adopted a hybrid examination such as the one
advocated in this Note.
B. Principles of Deed Interpretation
In order to fully understand disputes over the ownership of mineral
waste, it is necessary to have a general understanding of deed interpretation.
It is especially helpful to understand the principles regarding reservations
and exceptions in land conveyances, a fertile source of disputes between
surface and mineral owners. One such general principle is that the
conveying instrument must be read as a whole." Courts have noted that
in order to achieve fair interpretation of a broad form mineral deed, they
must not only consider the language of the conveying instrument, but also
the intent of the parties.2 3 This intent is to be determined from the deed
as a whole. 4 In doing so, conveyances should be interpreted just as other
contracts.2 5 Second, the language of the deed should be construed without
consideration of extrinsic evidence, unless the language of the deed is "so
ambiguous or obscure in meaning as to defy interpretation. ' '2 6 Conveying
language is deemed ambiguous if it is "'reasonably susceptible"' to different
interpretations. 7 In analyzing extrinsic evidence, the subsequent acts of
the parties following the land conveyance should be given great weight.2 8
In most disputes over the ownership of mineral wastes, as evidenced by
the cases to be discussed in this Note, the language of the deed is insufficient
to determine ownership. In fact, the varying tests and approaches presented
within this paper are chiefly concerned with the various types of extrinsic
evidence that should be taken into consideration by courts when deciding
these difficult ownership questions. A third general principle is that the
deeding instrument should be construed "most strongly against the grantor
and in favor of the grantee."2 9 This has also been held specifically in the
21 Hayes v. Alaska Juneau Forest Indus., Inc., 748 P.2d. 332, 335 (Alaska 1988).
22 Hosbach v. Head, 284 S.W.2d 684,685 (Ky. 1955).
23 Ward v. Harding, 860 S.W.2d z8o, 288 (Ky. 1993).
24 Yunkers Co-Ex'rs v. Mason, 284 S.W.2d 98, 99 (Ky. 1955).
25 Wright v. Bethlehem Minerals Co., 368 S.W.2d 179, I81 (Ky. 1963).
26 Hosbach, 284 S.W.zd at 685 (Ky. 1955).
27 Hoskins Heirs v. Boggs, 242 S.W.3d 320 (Ky. 2007) (quoting Blevins v. Riedling, 158
S.W.zd 646,648 (Ky. 1942)).
28 Sword v. Sword, 252 S.W.2d 869,870 (Ky. 1952).
29 Hosbach, 284 S.W.2d at 685.
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case of a mineral deed30 and in determining exactly what substances are
conveyed in a deed or lease of the mineral estate.3 These three principles
are to be applied concurrently.32 An important principle of interpretation,
especially when construing deeds written decades prior, is that "[w]ords
may in time shift in meaning, but in a deed they must be read in the sense
in which they were commonly used where the deed was written, and in
which the grantor and grantee then understood them. ' 3
C. Existing Kentucky Law and the Abandonment Test
Kentucky has only once decided a dispute between surface and mineral
estate owners, in the 1959 decision, Elk Horn Coal Corp. v. Allen.34 In Elk
Horn, the appellees, as surface owners, instituted an injunction proceeding
against the appellant, owner of the mineral estate, concerning the use
of a large slate dump pile, which was above ground. 3 The slate dump
contained "red dog," which had commercial use in highway and railroad
construction, as well as also being used in manufacturing at the time.36 The
coal company had maintained the slate dump while conducting mining
operations on the property.37 The appellees contended that the slate dump
became personal property, and thus part of the surface estate, when the
coal company ceased operations on the site and left the slate dump on the
property. 38
Kentucky's highest court, in deciding whether the slate dump constituted
the personal property of the surface owner, adopted the abandonment test.39
The court held that, "[i]n order to establish an abandonment of property,
there must be a showing of actual acts of relinquishment, accompanied
with the intention to abandon." 4 The court then noted that "[miere lapse
of time and nonuser [sic]" are not enough to establish abandonment. 4'
While the Elk Horn decision certainly supports the contention that
Kentucky has adopted the abandonment test, an approach also employed
by other states, the decision appears to be heavily influenced by the
particular facts of the case. The majority of the court's analysis in the
30 Isaacs v. Inland Steel Co., 205 S.W.ad 68i, 682 (Ky. 1947).
31 Rudd v. Hayden, 97 S.W.zd 35,36 (Ky. 1936).
32 Hosbach, 284 S.W.2d at 685.
33 Franklin Fluorspar Co. v. Hosick, 39 S.Wzd 665, 667 (Ky.1930.
34 Elk Horn Coal Corp. v. Allen, 324 S.W.zd 829 (Ky. 1959).
35 Id. at 830.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 831.





decision focuses on the mineral deed conveyed to the appellants, which
gave Elk Horn the right to "dump, store, and leave upon said land any
and all muck, bone, shale, water or other refuse from said mines" along
with an "unlimited time" to utilize the benefits of the deed. 4 Thus, the
court's analysis required cursory deed interpretation, as opposed to a more
factually complicated dispute that would require broader interpretation,
which would have provided precedent for more complex disputes. For
example, the slate dump was located above ground, as opposed to mineral
wastes long buried beneath the soil, and there were no subsequent land
transfers.43 The Elk Horn decision has yet to be cited by a Kentucky court
with respect to the abandonment of mine tailings, though it was cited in an
unreported Ohio decision.'
Despite its limitations, there is a discernible advantage to the
abandonment test. First, the test does provide predictability. This is due
to the heightened standard of proof, as the abandonment test requires
not only objective acts of relinquishment, but also requires a finding of a
subjective intent to abandon.4" Because the standard of proof is so high, it
is likely that the mineral waste will be deemed the property of the mineral
estate owner. While this may be an unfairly skewed test, it is nevertheless
predictable in application. One advantage to predictability is a decrease in
litigation, as parties and counsel are better able to resolve disputes without
instituting suit.
The disadvantages of the abandonment test are many As previously
mentioned, this test sharply favors the mineral owner by merely applying
principles of abandonment, with a highly elevated burden of proof.
Many disputes over the ownership of mineral wastes will arise decades
later. This means that the current mineral and surface owners-those
currently involved in the litigation-were not the owners when the waste
was originally disposed. Under the abandonment test, it could be nearly
impossible for the surface owner to establish the intent of a mineral owner
who disposed of the waste decades ago. A lack of available evidence as to
the intent of a depositor decades prior is an insufficient reason to deprive a
party of property rights. The abandonment test is simply inadequate in the
face of complicated property disputes, and in no way provides sufficient
precedent for further adjudication of these cases.
The test promulgated in the Elk Horn decision has its roots in a prior
case, Ellis v. McCormack/ 6 Ellis involved a dispute over the ownership of
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Mead Corp. v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, I983 WL 317
o , at 02 (Ohio Ct. App. April 25,
1983).
45 Id.
46 Ellis v. McCormack, z8 S.W.zd 391 (Ky. 1949).
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coal slack, which was left by the lessee after cessation of mining activities. 47
Inferring an intent to abandon from the facts presented, the Ellis Court
found that the appellee had "abandoned" the slack pile.41 One of the facts
presented was the selling of the necessary equipment to the appellant,
without mention of the slack pile. 49 The use of the abandonment test
originated in the Ellis decision, though the subjective intent requirement
was certainly weakened in this decision by applying an inference of intent
with little to substantiate that inference. Interestingly, the Kentucky Court
ofAppeals chose to cite the Ellis decision when explaining the abandonment
test in a recent unreported decision. 0 To date, the Ellis decision has yet to
be cited in any decisions concerning the ownership of mineral wastes.
The abandonment test is widely employed by a host of states, including
California,"' Montana,"2 Nevada,S3 Pennsylvania,M and Utah.5" These states
have tended to employ the abandonment test in a similar manner to that
of Kentucky courts. Additionally, other states have utilized the rule in
broader settings. For example, in Bakerv. Waite, a District Court of Appeals
in California applied the abandonment rule in determining who deserves
proceeds from a miner's lien.16 In Conway v. Fabian, the Supreme Court
of Montana used the abandonment rule to help decide a trespass action. 7
Notably, in none of the jurisdictions employing the abandonment rule is
there a case on point dealing with complicated ownership disputes, when
the dispute arises decades after the waste is deposited.
Though use of the abandonment rule concerning the ownership of
mineral waste is sparse, the rule has been widely employed among Kentucky
courts to decide other property issues. In Harper v. Johnson, the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky, then the highest court within the state, utilized the
abandonment test in deciding an action for declaratory and injunctive
relief brought by tenants.18 The court employed the same elements as
those presented in the Elk Horn decision, noting "[i]t is well settled that
47 Id. at 392.
48 Id. at 391-92.
49 Id
50 Kelley v. Nationwide Auto Restoration, L.L.C., 246 S.W.3d 470, 473 (Ky. Ct. App.
2007) (citing Ellis, 218 S.W.2d at 392).
51 See Jones v. Jackson, 9 Cal. 237,245 (1858); Baker v. Waite, 322 P.2d 512,54 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1958).
52 See Conway v. Fabian, 89 P.2d 1022, 1029 (Mont. 1939).
53 See Esmeralda Water Co. v. Mackley, 208 P.2d. 821, 824-28,831-32 (Nev. 1949).
54 See Fidelity-Pennsylvania Trust Co. v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 143 A. 474, 476-81
(Pa. 1928).
55 See Stephen Hays Estate, Inc. v. Togliatti, 38 P.2d io66, io68-69 (Utah 1934).
56 Baker v. Waite, 322 P.ad 512, 514-15 (3d Dist. 1958).
57 Conway, 89 P.2d. at 1029-30.
58 Harper v. Johnson, 294 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1956).
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abandonment of property is an intentional surrender or relinguishment
[sic] of a claim or right to the property. There must be a concurrence of
intention and an act manifesting that intention."' 9 The abandonment rule
was also used in Middlesboro Town & Land Co. v. Louisville & N.R. Co., an
action to quiet title to tracts of land." In another case, the rule was used to
determine whether a lessor had the right to re-enter and take possession of
leased premises.
61
It appears that the Kentucky courts in the Elk Horn and Ellis decisions
merely applied already established property concepts to adjudicate.
Unfortunately, the abandonment rule is inadequate to decide these cases.
Notably, states that have developed different guidelines for determining the
ownership of mineral wastes have all fashioned tests that deal specifically
with the extraction of natural resources. 6 This evidences the contention
that these property disputes are so unique as to require a specialized
analysis in order to ensure fair decision making. Such fairness is simply
impossible under the abandonment rule.
D. Lack of Guidance within Kentucky's Administrative Regulations
and Statutory Authority
Mining is a heavily regulated industry within Kentucky; the volume
of provisions devoted solely to the extraction of natural resources serves
as evidence. 63 Not surprisingly, due to the fact that unregulated mining
operations "create hazards dangerous to life and property,"' administrative
regulations are quite detailed concerning the disposition of mineral waste.
The regulations have many requirements, including extensive reporting
as to the design of the waste facility and sites, stability analyses, moisture
content, and particle size gradation. 65 Despite the numerous reporting
requirements, there is no explicit requirement that the coal operators state
59 Id. at 930.
60 Middlesboro Town & Land Co. v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 120 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Ky.
1938).
61 See Rice v. Rice, 50 S.W.ad z6 (Ky. 1932).
6z See infra notes 74-84, 85-103 and accompanying text. These tests include the intent
of the extractor controls, wastes that are intermingled with the earth constitute real property,
and mine tailings deposited for disposal are real property.
63 Several titles within Kentucky's Administrative Regulations are devoted solely to
natural resources, including regulations 400,401,402, and 405 (2007). The state of Kentucky has
also created an entire agency, known as the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection
Cabinet. 400 Ky. ADMIN REGS. 1:090 (2007). Furthermore, within the Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet is the Department for Surface Mining Reclamation and
Enforcement, which is charged to "adopt rules and administrative regulations for the strip
mining of coal." 405 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 1:020 (zoo7).
64 405 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 7:050 (2007).
65 Id.
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their future intent as to the waste disposal sites. Thus, sparse guidance-
and evidence-can be gleaned from the administrative regulations directly
concerning ongoing mineral waste disposal.
Other regulations provide that coal waste must be disposed of by the
approved processes set forth by the Kentucky Environmental and Public
Protection Cabinet, which calls for disposal in coal waste banks through
very specific and detailed means. 66 This regulation is also largely unhelpful
because modern mining technologies prevent commercially valuable
minerals from being deposited as waste. The fact that these valuable
minerals are no longer deposited as waste is a marked difference from
prior coal mining practices, which have been the catalyst for a plethora of
litigation.67 There is simply no regulation that speaks to the ownership of
mineral wastes, or even to the remining of mineral waste areas. It appears
that such remining is merely governed under the general provisions.
A survey of Kentucky's statutes is also unhelpful, as there are no statutes
that provide relevant authority or guidance concerning this issue, even
though the legislature has devoted an entire title to mines and minerals.68
The only related provisions deal with the severed mineral interests of
unknown or missing owners. 69 These provisions seek to explain the process
that occurs when a person severs minerals from a tract of land in which he
does not own and there is an unknown or missing owner, which is defined
as "any person vested with a severed mineral interest and whose present
identity and location cannot be determined from the records of the county
in which the land is located or by diligent inquiry."7 If there is a missing
owner, "the Circuit Court of the county in which the minerals or the major
portion thereof lies shall have the power to declare a trust therein, appoint a
trustee for the unknown or missing owners and authorize the trustee to sell,
execute and deliver a valid lease thereon .... " This is the extent to which
the statutes address the ownership of minerals or mineral waste in unique
situations, such as with missing owners. There are no guidelines or rules of
interpretation within the statutes that speak to disputes between surface
and mineral estate owners. Unsurprisingly, there are also no guidelines or
rules that address disputes over mineral waste.
It should be noted that Kentucky's legislature could deal with this issue
quite easily, with the passage of legislation that either announces a rule or
provides a standard through which courts are to adjudicate. As previously
explained, the legislature has crafted a plethora of laws dealing with mineral,
66 405 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 18:140 (2007).
67 See Foreman v. Beaverhead County, i6I P.2d. 524 (Mont. 1945).
68 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN., Title XXVIII.
69 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 353.460-.476 (West 1982).
70 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 353.460 (West 2oo8).
71 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 353.464 (West 2oo8).
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oil, and gas extraction.7" While many of the statutes and regulations deal
with the processes of the operators and heavily regulate these processes
with an environmental focus, some of the statutes and regulations deal
with relations between landowners, minerals owners, and neighboring
landowners. An example of this is the previously discussed statute, which
explains what an individual is to do if he or she wishes to mine on lands and
the owner is either missing or unknown.73
This demonstrates that Kentucky's legislature has felt compelled to
authorize and establish a statutory. scheme to deal with an issue relating to
the ownership of minerals. While this statute does notconcern the ownership
of mineral waste, it is a useful corollary. It demonstrates that the legislature
is capable of taking an issue that could involve extensive, complicated, and
expensive litigation and set forth a conclusive and streamlined procedure
through which to effect fair and efficient resolutions.
There is no known instance of any state entering the regulatory arena
in this fashion and declaring which rule or approach a court must use in
adjudicating disputes over the ownership of mineral waste. Though this
measure is not advocated in this Note, there would be advantages to
this approach. First and quite obviously, the creation of a statute would
eliminate any current debates over the use of other tests and thus would
provide a strong amount of predictability. Second, during the passage of the
law, there would likely be extensive research completed with practitioners
and industry professionals alike providing information and guidance.
There is one large disadvantage to the legislature establishing a rule
through which the ownership of mineral waste will be decided. This demerit
is that there is simply no way to predict what rule the legislature would adopt.
It does not matter whether a deficient rule, such as the abandonment test,
is adopted by the courts of the Commonwealth or whether it is formally
established through the statutory action of the legislature. The deficiency
is not lessened by the endorsement of the legislature. Therefore, there is
no truly expected benefit to be derived from legislative involvement on
this issue. While hopefully the legislature would take care in the creation
of such a statute, there is simply no guarantee. In addition, the possibility
of undue influence by special interest groups within the mineral extraction
industry is always a possibility that could lead to an unjust law.
II. ALTERNATIVE TESTS EMPLOYED IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
A. Intent of the Extractor Controls
The first alternative test presented, while different from that utilized by
72 See title 405 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. (2007).
73 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 353.460-476 (West 198z).
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Kentucky, is equally deficient in addressing complex ownership disputes.
The test employed by Alaska,74 California," and Arizona76 looks to the
intent of the extractor when the mining refuse was extracted and placed on
the disposal site. For example, in Hayes v. Alaska Juneau Forest Industries,
Inc.," the dispute was between the state of Alaska and the appellee as to
the ownership of minerals contained in tailings which covered submerged
lands.7" The facts surrounding this litigation are significant as they closely
mirror disputes likely to arise in Kentucky. The wastes in this case were
created by nearby mining operations and deposited over a twenty-five year
period. 7 9 The state asserted that the waste had since become real estate,
as opposed to the personal property of the depositor. 0 Alaska asserted
that because the tailings constituted real estate, they would have passed to
Alaska at statehood from the United States."' The court then acknowledged
that although mine wastes may become real estate through abandonment,
this is not the only way. The court, establishing another test, asserted that
when mine refuse is "deposited for the purpose of disposal, as distinct from
being stockpiled for future use, it becomes real estate even though they are
not abandoned." 2 Under this test, it is the intent of the depositor at the
time of disposal that is dispositive.
The approach in Hayes is quite divergent from the abandonment test, as
only the purpose of disposal at that time is important, and not the later actions
of the depositor. For example, a mineral owner may create a slack pile of
mineral refuse, intending later to see if the pile contains any commercially
valuable "red dog." After the cessation of mining activities, the operator
may decide not to explore this possibility. Under the abandonment test,
it will be the latter action-the decision to determine whether "red dog"
exists-that will be important. In the intent of the extractor test, only the
purpose with which the slack pile was created is significant. Obviously, a
very different outcome can be reached under the intent of the extractor
test as to that reached under the abandonment test.
Other states that employ the intent of the extractor test mirror the
analysis utilized by the Alaska court. Arizona has actively been using the
test for almost a century, holding that it is the intention with which the
refuse was deposited that controls in determining whether the refuse is
74 See Hayes v. Alaska Juneau Forest Indus., Inc., 748 P.2d. 332, 334-35 (Alaska 1988).
75 See State ex rel. Dept. of Water Resources v. Superior Court of Butte County, zo8 Cal.
App. 2d 659,664-65 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
76 See Steinfeld v. Omega Copper Co., 141 P. 847, 848 (Ariz. 1914).
77 Hayes, 748 P.zd. at 332.
78 Id. at 333.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 334.
8I Id.
82 Id. at 334-35.
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realty and thus under the ownership of the mineral owner, or whether the
refuse constitutes personal property.'
A significant advantage of the intent of the extractor test is that it appears
fairer than the abandonment test. Unlike the abandonment test, there is
no automatic skewing in determining the ownership of the mineral waste.
By focusing on a discrete moment, when the waste is disposed, courts are
better able to adjudicate decisions by narrowing the volume of facts that
impact the outcome. This is an especially useful test if the dispute occurs
shortly after the refuse deposit.
Disadvantages of the intent of the extractor test are readily apparent.
The most significant demerit is the difficultly, if not impossibility, of
determining the intent of a depositor if the deposit occurred decades prior.
While the language of the deeding instrument may provide guidance, courts
may be left without any tangible proof as to the intent of the depositor.
For example, in Steinfeld v. Omega Copper Co., the court, in determining the
intent of the extractor, relied almost exclusively on the testimony of the
depositor in ruling.84 One must question what recourse would have been
available to the court had this testimony been unavailable.
Another disadvantage is that current owners of mineral and surface
estates will have their rights determined by actions that may have occurred
decades prior, actions of which they were unaware when land conveyances
were transacted. Focusing on the intent of the extractor could allow a
court to disregard the expectations of the current parties, a proposition that
strikes many as unfair.
A final disadvantage under this test is that interested parties are afforded
even less predictability than under the abandonment test. Further, the test
cannot truly be applied in the absence of litigation. The abandonment test,
in looking for acts of relinquishment, retained a modicum of objectivity.
By focusing entirely on the intent of the depositor, a completely subjective
examination, parties cannot begin to predict the court's decision because the
test necessitates the taking of testimony and evidence. In sum, the intent
of the extractor is equally unsatisfying in deciding complicated questions
of mine refuse ownership. While the test certainly has positive attributes,
it should not be adopted by Kentucky because of its many disadvantages.
B. Wastes Intermingled with the Earth are Real Property
An alternate test promulgated in a few states is unconcerned with
the intent of the depositor at the time of the deposit and at the time of
83 Steinfeld v. Omega Copper Co., 141 P. 847, 848 (Ariz. 1914).
84 Id.
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abandonment. Montana,85 Nevada,86 and Ohio87 all hold that mine waste
deposits mingled or embedded in the earth constitutes real property. In
Foreman v. Beaverhead County, the Supreme Court of Montana clearly
explained the rule. 8  In Foreman, the court was forced to determine
the status of mine waste deposited over a period of years.8 9 The refuse
contained valuable minerals, a fact known to the company at the time of
disposal, but the available machinery and processes were not capable of
separating the minerals from the waste.90 The land containing the tailings
was later sold to the plaintiff, who began recovering the mineral waste.
The issue in Foreman was whether the recovery of minerals constituted
recovery of personal property, thus excusing the plaintiff from paying real
property taxes.
The court then explained the test to determine the status of the mineral
waste, noting that "if [mineral waste deposits] are permitted to spread
upon and to mingle with the earth, they become a part thereof and are real
estate, but if they are kept separate and apart therefrom, as in the instant
case, they are personal property."91 In a later decision, which mirrored the
dispute in Foreman, Pfizer, Inc. v. Madison County, the Supreme Court of
Montana cited that decision, and it continued the use of the test.9
Ohio employed the "intermingled" test in In Re Appropriation of
Easements for Highways Purposes.93 In this decision, the Supreme Court of
Ohio held that waste stone did not constitute personal property and thus
should be included in calculating the fair market value of real estate in an
action in which the state wished to establish an easement.94 The waste
stone was the result of an abandoned quarry,95 and the stone refuse had
been dumped over and down a hill for many years prior to the origination
of the dispute. 96 Because the waste stone was now embedded in and on
top of the soil, the court held that the refuse did not constitute personal
property, but instead was merely real estate. 97 This decision demonstrates
85 Darby Spar, Ltd. v. Dep't of Revenue, 705 P.2d i i i (Mont. 1985).
86 Rogers v. Cooney, 7 Nev. 213 (Nev. 1872).
87 In Re Appropriation of Easements for Highway Purposes, i9o N.E.2d 446 (Ohio
1963).
88 Foreman v. Beaverhead County, 16I P.2d. 524,525 (Mont. 1945).
89 Id. at 524.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Pfizer Inc. v. Madison Co., 505 P.zd 399, 401 (Mont. 1973).
93 In Re Appropriation of Easements for Highway Purposes, 19o N.E.2d 446, 449 (Ohio
1963).
94 Id.
95 Id. at 447.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 449.
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an alternative use for this test, indicative of the broad applicability of
this approach. It should be noted that the Ohio decision has been quite
important precedent in the calculation of fair market values in eminent
domain cases and has been broadly cited by a host of courts and secondary
sources.
98
Despite the limited usage of this test, it possesses many advantages.
The most significant advantage to looking at whether the wastes
are intermingled with the earth is that it is a purely objective test. By
removing the subjective elements that weaken the adequacy of the other
tests, measurable evidentiary difficulties are eliminated. Whereas it may
be impossible to determine the intent of the operator when the mine
refuse was deposited decades earlier, under this test, there is no temporal
evidentiary hindrance. As demonstrated in the Foreman decision, disputes
arising many years after the initial deposit present complicated ownership
questions." The court was allowed to rely exclusively on the status of the
waste in relation to the topography of the soil in reaching its decision.1°
Further, the court is not forced to look back to the time of deposit. Instead,
it is free to look at the current state of the waste, which greatly simplifies
the necessary fact-finding. The chronological advantages of this test are
great and cannot be overstated.
Not only does this test simplify decision making through the removal
of complicated evidentiary standards, it also provides for fair adjudication.
There is intuitive appeal to the visual approach presented by this test. If
one purchases a parcel of land upon which mine tailings have been scattered
on the ground and are invisible to the eye, or if the parcel contains a former
slurry pond a few feet beneath the surface, it is unlikely that that the
purchaser would consider these elements personal property. However, if
someone purchases a tract of land upon which a well-contained and orderly
gravel pile is located, said purchaser would likely view the pile as personal
property. Such reasoning is equally applicable when there has been a sale
of either just the mineral or surface estate. Thus, not only does this test
simplify the required evidentiary findings, it also protects the reasonable
expectations of both the purchaser and the seller, especially if the seller
has retained a portion of the land, such as the surface estate. This is well
demonstrated in the Foreman decision, as the plaintiff bought the land to
98 This decision has been cited in cases such as Cincinnati v. Banks, 757 N.E.2d 1205
(Ohio Ct. App. zoo0); Wray v. Stvartak, 700 N.E.2d 347 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997); and Columbia
Gas Transmission Corp. v. Exclusive Natural Gas Storage Easement, 962 F.2d 1192 (6th. Cir. 1992)
(applying Ohio law). In addition, the decision has been cited extensively in Ohio practice
guides for eminent domain, such as in 38 Ohio Jur. 3d Eminent Domain § 148 (zoo8) and 38
Ohio Jut. 3d Eminent Domain § 186 (2oo8).
99 Foreman v. Beaverhead County, 161 P.2d. 524 (Mont. 1945).
i oo Id.
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recover the minerals from the tailings visibly spread upon the earth."° It
may be inferred that the plaintiff assumed he was merely using the personal
property he had bought, rather than utilizing real estate. When the court
agreed with this contention, finding the tailings to constitute personal
property, the plaintiff's reasonable expectations were fulfilled.," It follows
that the purchase price would have varied greatly had the plaintiff and the
seller thought the land being sold was conducive to mining.
A final advantage is the great level of predictability afforded by this
test. This predictability results from the objective examination required,
as parties are better able to discern their respective property rights by
merely conducting a visual examination. Furthermore, parties may be able
to resolve disputes without instituting legal action, a consequence of the
high level of predictability associated with this test. By providing property
owners with a clear, easily applied rule, parties are better able to understand
their rights not only when a dispute arises, but at the point of purchase and
contract as well.
Despite the overwhelming advantages of a test which looks to
whether the wastes are embedded or intermingled with the earth, there
are disadvantages. One disadvantage is that the court may be required to
make difficult judgment calls, as it may not be clear whether the waste is
embedded in the soil or merely resting on top of the soil in a disorderly
fashion. A modification of the facts in Foreman provides an explanation of
this concern. In Foreman, the tailings were deposited in well-defined piles,
marked with bulkheads. 3 One must question the outcome of Foreman if
the facts were altered so that the tailings were in a generally confined area,
yet in a non-cohesive pile without well-defined boundaries. In such a
close case, the intermingled test does not provide further guidance in how
to adjudicate. Thus, it is likely that different courts, reviewing the same
facts, may decide cases differently as a result of the insufficiency of this
test.
Because of the difficulty presented by close cases, another disadvantage is
that the test provides little predictability in these situations. While decisions
may be expected in clear fact patterns, there is little, if any, predictive value
within the test in difficult factual disputes. This shortcoming should be
taken into account when considering the utilization of this test.
III. ADVOCATING A NEW TEST FOR KENTUCKY
Though Kentucky has utilized the abandonment test exclusively when
dealing with the ownership of mineral wastes,' 04 this practice should be
ioi Id. at 524-25.
1O2 Id. at 525-26.
io3 Id. at 524.
104 Elk Horn Coal Corp. v. Allen, 324 S.W.2d 829, 830-31 (Ky. 1959); Ellis v. McCormack,
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discontinued. Kentucky courts should instead adopt a hybrid test, which
incorporates the advantages of a variety of approaches, simultaneously
diminishing the weaknesses presented by the reliance on any one test.
While no state has formally adopted the use of more than one test, a few
states routinely employ multiple approaches. For example, in the Alaska
decision Hayes v. Alaska Juneau Forest Industries, Inc.,10 the court employed
two different approaches. First, the court utilized the abandonment test,
holding that if mine wastes are abandoned, they become real estate. 1°6 If
the mine tailings are not abandoned, they remain the personal property of
whoever created the refuse.' °7 In addition to the abandonment test, the
Alaska court also employed the intent of the extractor test.10 8 The court
noted, "[wihere mine tailings are deposited for purpose of disposal, the
tailings are considered realty."'0 9 Thus, the Alaskan court recognized-and
employed-two tests concurrently.
Alaska is not the only state to utilize more than one approach in
deciding disputes over the status of mineral wastes. Montana also
employed multiple tests in Conway v. Fabian.10 In Conway, the Supreme
Court of Montana employed the abandonment test, which contained both
an objective and subjective analysis, as the court looked for both acts and
intentions of relinquishment, to decide the ownership of mine tailings
that were the waste product of a quarry mill."' The court then quoted
an Arizona decision, Steinfeld v. Omega Copper Co., noting "'[t]he intention
with which the owner of the property extracted the ore from the ground
and the purpose and intention of the owner with which it was placed on
the dump is controlling in arriving at a solution of the question of whether
the ore after having been extracted and placed in the dump was personalty
or realty..''  The Montana court followed the trend of the Alaska courts
by utilizing both the abandonment test and the approach that looks to the
extent of the extractor.
Though the varied approaches utilized by Alaska and Montana are to be
applauded, the two approaches the courts employed are not a combination
that Kentucky courts should adopt. This is because of the overwhelmingly
subjective nature of both the abandonment test and the intent of the
218 SW.2d 391, 392 (Ky. 194i). These are the only cases in which Kentucky courts have
decided the ownership of mineral wastes, with both courts relying only on the abandonment
test.
105 Hayes v. Alaska Juneau Forest Indus., Inc., 748 Pad 332 (Alaska 1988).
io6 Id. at 335.
107 Id.
io8 See supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
io9 Hayes, 748 P.2d at 336.
i1o Conway v. Fabian., 89 P.2d 1022 (Mont. 1939).
iii Id. at 1o9-3o.
112 Id. at 1029 (quoting Steinfied v. Omega Copper Co., 141 P. 847 (Ariz. 1914)).
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extractor approach. While the abandonment test does look to actual acts
of relinquishment in addition to requiring an intent to abandon," 3 the
subjective element is still a significant element of the test. Under the
intent of the extractor approach, as demonstrated in Hayes, the "intention"
of the extractor and depositor controls," 4 necessitating a subjective analysis.
As previously explained,"' such subjectivity leads to difficult evidentiary
requirements. Thus, the varied approach utilized by Montana and Alaska
is inadequate because the subjective element remains important in both
tests.
Kentucky instead should adopt an amalgam approach that eliminates
the necessary reliance on subjectivity. The first component of this proposed
test should be to adopt the approach which holds that wastes intermingled
or fixed within the earth constitute real property."6 This approach should
be the first element to which a court looks when deciding a dispute over
the ownership of mineral waste. Under this approach, the courts would
employ the reasoning of the Montana court in Foreman."7 As the Supreme
Court of Montana explained, "[i]f [mineral wastes] are permitted to spread
upon and to mingle with the earth, they become a part thereof and are real
estate, but if they are kept separate and apart therefrom, as in the instant
case, they are personal property." ''1 Thus, courts should first look to the
objective status of the wastes. The court will need to issue a finding of fact
concerning the status of these wastes, which will state whether the visual
condition of the mineral refuse supports the contention that the wastes
are either personal property or real estate. This finding of fact should
be a rebuttable presumption. This presumption may be reversed by the
introduction of subjective evidence supporting a contrary contention. The
evidence should be grounded in tangibility, such as was demonstrated by
the decision in Elk Horn Coal Corp. v. Allen."9 In Elk Horn Coal Corp., the
plaintiff's assertion that he had not abandoned the tailings was supported
by the language of the conveying instrument, which provided the plaintiff
unlimited time to store and deposit mineral refuse upon the surface, which
had been retained by the seller."' 0 Thus, the subjective element, which
may rebut a presumption, cannot merely be unsubstantiated testimony. If
so, the entire purpose of eliminating the subjectivity of the abandonment
113 Elk Horn Coal Corp. v. Allen, 324 S.W.zd 829, 830 (Ky. 1959).
114 Hayes, 748 P.zd at 336-37.
115 See supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
i 16 See Re Appropriation of Easements for Highway Purposes 19o N.E.2d 446 (Ohio
1963); Rogers v. Cooney, 7 Nev. 213 (Nev. 1872); Spar, Ltd. v. Dep't of Revenue, 705 P.2d I II
(Mont. 1985).
117 Foreman v. Beaverhead County, 161 P.ad. 524, 525 (Mont. 1945).
18 Id.
119 Elk Horn Coal Corp. v. Allen, 324 S.Wad 829, 83o-31 (Ky. 1959).
120 Id. at 832.
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test would be diminished.
In adopting this new, two-pronged approach, Kentucky will have no
need to employ the abandonment test in future mineral refuse disputes.
This is evident upon examination of the two elements of the abandonment
test, which are an actual act of relinquishment coupled with a stated
intention to abandon."' The actual acts of relinquishment requirement will
be subsumed within the first prong of the proposed test, which looks to the
current status of the wastes. If the mineral wastes have been "permitted to
spread upon and to mingle with the earth,"' then the logical assumption
would be that the wastes had been abandoned. Conversely, if the mineral
refuse "[is] kept separate and apart"'2 3 from the soil, then there would
likely not be an appearance of abandonment, as careful maintenance would
strongly imply a continued claim of ownership. The second element of
the abandonment test looks to an intention of abandonment.2 4 Under the
proposed approach, this would also be integrated into the opportunity to
rebut the presumption created by the objective examination of the current
status of the mineral waste.
There is a strong correlation between the two elements of the
abandonment test and the newly proposed test, as the components of the
former are easily incorporated into the latter. What is different, and better,
about the new approach is that the court's focus is greatly widened. As
these cases can be immensely complicated and fact intensive, the narrow
focus on abandonment will prove insufficient, as demonstrated when the
test fails in more complex disputes. Under this new approach, the court is
free to consider more factors and considerations in an orderly and logical
manner.
With the shortcomings of the subjective elements in disputes over the
ownership of mineral waste, one may wonder why the proposed approach
contains such a component at all. This is especially true as significant
attention has been given to the lessened predictability associated with
the subjective tests. This second prong is necessary to eliminate the
disadvantages demonstrated in the Foreman decision, such as the decreased
predictive value in "close" cases.' As discussed, the Foreman decision was
a close one: the status of the mineral tailings, while deemed to be personal
property, easily could have been determined to be real estate.2 6 In these
close decisions, the court must be able to consider extrinsic evidence to
allow for fair adjudication. This additional evidence constitutes the second
prong of the proposed approach. By being able to consider testimony of
121 Id. at 830.
122 Foreman, 16i P.2d. at 525.
123 Id. at 525.
124 Elk Horn Coal Corp., 324 S.W.2d at 830.
125 See Foreman, I61 P.2d at 526.
126 Id. at 525-26.
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the parties to the action, the language of the deeding or leasing instrument,
industry standards and practices, and other relevant information, the court
will be able to determine the status of the tailings in the fairest manner
achievable. In "easy" cases, where the status of the waste as intermingled
or not is readily ascertainable, parties will be able to determine their rights
more easily, often without instituting action. In difficult cases, parties
must be able to submit all evidence relevant to the adjudication of the
waste dispute. This broad allowance of testimony necessarily requires
the introduction of subjective evidence, which may prove dispositive in
otherwise close cases. Thus, the second prong of the test, albeit subjective,
is necessary.
CONCLUSION
Kentucky continues to be a world leader in the production of coal."2 7 So
long as the industry remains viable and strong, disputes over the ownership
of mineral wastes are likely to continue. Due to the importance of this
issue, Kentucky must discard its use of an abandonment test that, while
playing an important role in other areas of property law, is insufficient and
not conducive to fair and well-reasoned adjudication of these complex
disputes. In discarding the abandonment test, the courts should consider
the advantages and limitations presented by the approaches employed
elsewhere in the country. By adopting the approach this Note has advocated,
Kentucky will enjoy the benefits of objectivity which look to the status of
the mineral waste to determine if it is intermingled with the earth, while
also considering the intent of the extractor. As an industry leader in mineral
extraction, it is time for Kentucky to establish a new approach which is
conducive to the continuing improvements in mining technology and the
accompanying litigation these advances present.
127 Ky. COAL MKTG. AND Exp. COUNCIL, supra note 2.
2oo8- 2009]

